FLORES

1/16/2011

COMPETITION IN THE UNDERWRITING
MARKETS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE
BARING CRISIS REVISITED
JUAN H. FLORES*
I
INTRODUCTION
An important topic in the literature on capital markets is the role of
underwriters as gatekeepers. Underwriters are mainly used by investors to
reduce information costs about new issues, thereby improving market
efficiency.1 They are called “reputational intermediaries” because they put their
reputation at stake if a new issue turns out to be a failure. Underwriters also act
as distributors of new securities, participate in most of the activities related to
the pricing and selling of new securities, and give advice to both issuers and
investors. Still, for practical purposes, they bear limited responsibility for
failures and defaults in the case of sovereign debt. More recent sovereign
defaults have involved issues that were equally distributed among all
underwriters, with the result that the value of reputation has strongly
diminished.2 In addition, the regulatory framework in place and the emergence
of rating agencies in the 1930s have dissolved the gatekeeping functions of these
different actors.3
The nineteenth century is regarded as a period of high international
financial integration, for capital could flow freely across international borders.
Underwriting of bonds for foreign governments was an important business, and
its expansion was interrupted only by World War I. Financial intermediaries
fulfilled a role as sole gatekeepers because this was the only way international
capital markets could operate; information asymmetries were high and thus
merchant, or investment, banks were the only agents informally responsible for
the success of investment in foreign securities. Of course, this system involved
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REV. 549, 621 (1984).
2. See Marc Flandreau et al., The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign
Debt Markets, 1815–2007, at 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,128, 2009).
3. See Royce de R. Barondes et al., Underwriter’s Counsel as Gatekeeper or Turnstile: An
Empirical Analysis of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, 2 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 164, 164
(2007) (providing empirical evidence that law-firm prestige affects the performance of IPOs).
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other risks such as potential conflicts of interest and occasional overlending
during euphoric periods. The first episode of overlending began during the
1820s as the lending boom to the newly independent Latin American countries
ended with a series of defaults and the sudden stop of capital exports from
London, then the main financial center of the world.4 A second lending boom
occurred during the 1860s and ended similarly, this time with the international
crisis of 1873, a second wave of defaults, and attempts by the British authorities
to regulate their capital market. By then, a few financial intermediaries had
differentiated themselves from the rest by their reputation, for they issued
bonds that mostly avoided default. Among these merchant houses were the
Barings and the Rothschilds. They also held by far the highest market shares,
providing credibility to their gatekeeping function; a bad choice would have
negatively affected their reputation and thus, their market power.
This article looks at the third lending boom episode, which took place
during the 1880s and ended in 1890 with the so-called Baring crisis.
Underwriters in Europe issued loans on behalf of Argentina’s municipalities,
states, and federal government. Competition pushed them to assume increasing
risk exposure, which eventually led to Baring’s bankruptcy in 1890 and the need
for a rapid bailout orchestrated by the Bank of England. This prevented a
banking panic in London but could not avert a sudden stop in capital exports
from England to the rest of the world.
This article revisits the episode and focuses on the bargaining power of
Argentina’s federal government relative to that of the underwriting banks. In
particular, it examines how the financial intermediaries’ gatekeeping function
eroded when faced with increased competition. The fiscal position of
Argentina’s government deteriorated during those years, mainly due to
increased fiscal imbalances and the depreciation of the paper peso. Under
normal circumstances, underwriters should have impeded Argentinean access
to capital markets or at least hardened the terms under which Argentina could
borrow. Instead, underwriters offered better terms and accelerated lending. To
demonstrate this phenomenon, this article looks at two particular clauses in
debt contracts. First, it examines the clause related to the agreed-upon
distribution system. Before the 1880s, Argentina’s debt contracts were issued
under what is now known as the “best efforts” system. Beginning in 1881,
however, new loans were mainly issued under the “firm commitment” system.
Second, this article reviews the clause related to the cost of each distribution
system. Net proceeds for a government under firm commitment generally
decrease because banks impose a commission for the risk they incur if they fail
to place the bonds. Looking at the purchase prices received by Argentina for its
loans, however, this article finds that Argentina’s borrowing costs actually
decreased during the 1880s. Thus, underwriters assumed the risk from the loan

4. See Marc Flandreau & Juan Flores, Bonds and Brands: Intermediaries and Reputation in
Sovereign Debt Markets: 1820–1830, 69 J. ECON. HIST. 646, 659 (2009).
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issues, but with lower expected gains, giving Argentina greater incentives to
overborrow and culminating in the Baring crisis.
II
THE BARING CRISIS: ON ECONOMICS AND BEYOND
A brief overview of more than a hundred years of economic analysis on the
Baring crisis may sound too ambitious. However, this financial episode has
traditionally been looked at only from a macroeconomic point of view.
Conventional explanations have exposed problems mostly on the demand side
(mainly Argentina’s economic policies). The only existing supply-side theory
that explains lender problems has focused on speculative manias.5
Scholars initially reasoned that the Baring crisis was due to increasing
commercial deficits in Argentina during the 1880s. Because foreign capital flows
were necessary to minimize exchange-rate depreciation (foreign debt was
denominated in foreign currency), the freezing of these flows translated into
exchange-rate depreciation and thus, an external crisis.
Using the same data, other scholars have similarly analyzed the cyclical
aspects of external factors (capital flows and exports) and their repercussions on
the Argentinean economy.6 The Baring crisis was preceded by an expansive
phase in the world economy and was fed by a rise in demand for external loans
by the government. This situation resulted in credit expansion, consumption
increase, excessive confidence, and a general feeling of prosperity that
translated into financial and property speculation. When the Bank of England
raised its interest rates in the late 1880s, capital flows stopped and brought
Argentina into the lowest point of its financial crisis.
Adopting a similar view, some scholars have suggested that imbalances in
the external sector were responsible for the convertibility failure in the 1880s as
a result of the different phases in capital flows: indebtedness was followed by an
increase in imports and currency depreciation.7 When these flows stopped, the
debt still had to be serviced—in gold. This phase did not last long because
investment returns did not sufficiently compensate for the increase in imports
and debt payments. In 1890, Argentina was particularly affected by this
imbalance, which was reinforced by the macroeconomic policies of the 1880s
that encouraged credit expansion, even though investment returns in the export
sector were not yet adequate to cover external payments.

5. See CHARLES H. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL CRISES 25, 101–02 (4th ed. 1978) (describing how speculative manias, or high volume
trading in assets at inflated prices, may arise from investment bubbles).
6. See, e.g., Raúl Prebisch, Anotaciones Sobre Nuestro Medio Circulante. A Propósito del Último
Libro del Dr. Norberto Piñero IX–X, REVISTA DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS (Buenos Aires) 10, serie 2
(10–11): 287–307 (Mayo – Junio 1922) (alternatively, the same article has been published in: Raúl
Prebisch: Obras; 1919–1948. Buenos Aires, Fundación Raúl Prebisch, 1991, vol. I, 142–75).
7. See ALEC G. FORD, THE GOLD STANDARD, 1880–1914: BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA 102–47
(1962).
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Alternatively, the Baring crisis may have had its roots in Argentina’s
monetary policies.8 As a response to increases in credit and money supply, the
public purchased gold anticipating currency devaluation. This caused reserve
outflows and money depreciation, which translated into difficulties for
Argentina in meeting the country’s debt service.
Others have expanded this view to encompass the fiscal side.9 The Baring
crisis, they have argued, was caused by inconsistent monetary and fiscal policies
in Argentina during the 1880s that sought a return to currency convertibility
while running persistent fiscal deficits. There was some improvement by 1886,
but fiscal matters became fragile in 1888, which affected the public’s perception
of inflation. This caused people to abandon paper currency for specie, resulting
in currency depreciation. These problems were compounded by further money
creation to finance deficits and by the impossibility of obtaining access to
capital markets.
On the supply side, some writers have questioned investors’ rationality and
have suggested that the Baring crisis was a typical investment bubble.10 Low
rates of return on British investments and suddenly favorable investment
prospects in Argentina caused the displacement necessary for a boom in
Argentinean financial assets. The writers argue that the Baring crisis followed a
typical euphoria-to-distress path during the 1880s. However, they identify the
downturn of the euphoria for Argentinean bonds as occurring in 1888—two
years before the outbreak of the crisis—when German investors sold their
bonds to their British counterparts even as other investors continued to buy.
This has attracted scholars’ attention as one of the few historical cases where
“enthusiasm of one class of investor for a security failed to communicate itself
for long to another.”11 The crisis precipitated when the true state of Argentina
became publicly known through the calamitous adverse events of 1890, such as
the March technical default and the July political riots in Buenos Aires.
In this author’s view, fiscal and monetary policies were full of flaws and
investors’ sustained purchases were not well advised. By taking into account
key features of the nineteenth-century international financial architecture, this
article will introduce new elements that led to the crisis. Traditional
explanations leave a number of important questions unanswered, including the
forecast of the crisis. The deteriorating financial situation of the country in
general—and of the fiscal position of the government in particular—did not
deter investors from channeling new and increasing funds to Argentina. We can
8. See ROBERTO CORTES CONDE, DINERO, DEUDA Y CRISIS: EVOLUCIÓN MONETARIA Y
FINANCIERA EN ARGENTINA 155–57 (1989).
9. See Gerardo della Paolera, Monetary and Banking Experiments in Argentina: 1861–1930, at 540
(Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Working Paper No. 11, 1995); GERARDO DELLA PAOLERA & ALAN
TAYLOR, STRAINING WITH THE ANCHOR: IN SEARCH OF MONETARY STABILITY, ARGENTINA AND
THE GOLD STANDARD, 1880–1935, at 133–52 (2001).
10. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 5, at 23–47.
11. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, KEYNESIANISM VS. MONETARISM, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN
FINANCIAL HISTORY 230 (1985).
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only wonder how Argentina managed to maintain its capital-market access in
the months before the outbreak of the crisis.12 Contemporary economists as well
as economic historians in their later works adhere to this view, and one pointed
out that “[i]n 1886, European investors already began to suspect that the
Argentine credit was being overworked.”13 They argue that fear for the stability
of Argentine finances existed as early as 1886.14 Some also suggest that investors
could have expected the crisis in early 1888 and remark that the first “technical
default” of Argentina was in 1889, more than a year before the crisis.15
In fact, reports and publications of the time lead us to support this
generalized consensus. Crédit Lyonnais, a French deposit bank that became a
leading voice in European financial markets after 1890, advised against
investing in Argentina as early as 1887.16 Michael Mulhall, a recognized
statistician on economic matters in South America, suggested prudence about
the immediate economic future of the country.17 The financial press in Europe
was increasingly hostile to Argentina, openly referring to the country’s financial
situation as a “crisis” since 1887.18 Finally, the publication Fenn on the Funds
classified Argentina as a problem country in 1889 by calculating an “early
warning” debt crisis indicator that took into account the country’s debt service
and its level of exports.19
Surprisingly, the markets’ behavior did not reflect these views. Spreads of
Argentinean public bonds on U.K. consols remained stable during the late
1880s. Moreover, bonds on behalf of Argentina’s federal, provincial, and
municipal governments continued to be issued in European financial markets.
Although speculation may have been persistent during the last years before the
crisis, it likely does not explain the whole story. Besides, a purely
macroeconomic view cannot explain what led to the crisis, given that some
macroeconomic variables deteriorated considerably in the preceding years. The
answer may instead come from a microeconomic perspective, as historians have

12. From a public finance point of view, some scholars argue that Argentina’s troubles began in
1885 with the suspension of the gold exchange standard. See JOSE TERRY, LA CRISIS, 1885–1892, at 78–
87 (1893). In addition, others have pointed out that the financial policy of Argentina’s government in
the late 1880s could only lead to bankruptcy. See Tim Duncan, La Política Fiscal Durante el Gobierno
de Juarez Célman, 1886–1890, 23 DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO 479, 479–514 (1984).
13. Max Wirth, The Crisis of 1890, 1 J. POL. ECON. 214, 218 (1893).
14. See Barry Eichengreen, The Baring Crisis in a Mexican Mirror, 20 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 249,
263 (1999).
15. See DAVID JOSLIN, A CENTURY OF BANKING IN LATIN AMERICA 121 (1963); DELLA
PAOLERA & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 19.
16. Crédit Lyonnais Archives, DEEF 73405.
17. See Michael Mulhall, Argentine Wealth and Debt, BUENOS AIRES STANDARD, Feb. 26, 1890
(containing some of Michael Mulhall’s estimates on wealth and debt in Argentina).
18. See, e.g., THE BULLIONISH, Aug. 27, 1887 (referring to Argentina’s finances as having a
“disastrous condition”); THE STATIST, Nov. 3, 1888 (favoring a change in economic policy to prevent a
“crash”).
19. For a detailed explanation of this index, see MARC FLANDREAU & FREDERIC ZUMER, THE
MAKING OF GLOBAL FINANCE, 1880–1913, at 48–49 (2004).
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long recognized.20
III
NINETEENTH-CENTURY CAPITAL MARKETS FOR SOVEREIGN PUBLIC
OFFERINGS
This article tries to fill the gaps in the literature on the Baring crisis by
taking into account the industrial organization of international capital markets.
One specific channel that is vital in explaining the crisis is the sovereign debt
issue mechanism.21 The sources consulted for this section are both primary and
secondary, including classic works mainly concerned with London and Paris
bond issues, some German works, debt contracts from bank archives in London
and Paris, and associated correspondence.
Classic scholarly works detail how, in the nineteenth century, European
financial markets were integrated in many aspects, particularly in sovereign
debt bond issues.22 Analyzing only one market would not create a complete
picture of this integration due to the interaction of competition and solidarity
between these markets. This article thus focuses on the main differences
between financial places and on the role of debt contracts in the whole
mechanism.
Bond issuance in the financial markets of the late nineteenth century can be
regarded as a four-stage process, although particulars varied according to the
countries, intermediaries, and markets involved. The four stages are (1) the
search for an intermediary, (2) the choice of an issue system, (3) the planning of
the issue, and (4) market placement. The decision on how the bonds were to be
issued was made in the first two stages and the terms were formalized in a
document—the debt contract—signed by the financial intermediary and the
government.

20. See Carlos Marichal, Los Banqueros Europeos y los Empréstitos Argentinos: Rivalidad y
Colaboración, 1880–1890, 2 REVISTA DE HISTORIA ECONOMICA 47, 75 (1984).
21. Today, this channel is also known as sovereign initial public offerings (IPOs).
22. See generally LELAND H. JENKS, THE MIGRATION OF BRITISH CAPITAL TO 1875 (1927); ALEC
K. CAIRNCROSS, HOME AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1870–1913: STUDIES IN CAPITAL
ACCUMULATION (1953); DAVID FINNIE, CAPITAL UNDERWRITING: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF UNDERWRITING CAPITAL ISSUES, TOGETHER WITH A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF ALL THE MAIN UNDERWRITING AND SUBUNDERWRITING AGREEMENTS (1934);
TOSHIO SUZUKI, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT LOAN ISSUES ON THE LONDON CAPITAL MARKET, 1870–
1913 (1934). It has been a general practice that these authors use almost the same primary sources. A
first and basic reference is an article in The Banker’s Magazine of July 1876, which describes the
evolution of bonds’ issues mechanism during the period of 1860 through 1870 (although other press
articles are sometimes cited, particularly in Suzuki’s work). A second reference is the writings of Henry
Osborne O’Hagan, an active stockbroker in foreign loans and an important supporter of banks’
syndicalization in order to diminish the risks from bonds’ issues. A third and recurrent reference is the
work of 2 HENRY D. WOLFF, RAMBLING RECOLLECTIONS (1908). Finally, Leland Jenks primarily uses
the “Special Reports from the Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States.” United Kingdom House
of Commons Select Committee on Loans to Foreign States (Apr. 19, 1875).
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A. Searching for an Intermediary
External borrowing through international financial markets required
governments to look for an intermediary.23 In some cases, parliaments enacted
laws allowing the government to look for funds for particular projects.
Governments could name an agent to negotiate a loan in Europe with financial
intermediaries, mainly merchant banks. Banks could also take the initiative and
propose their services to potential borrowers, a process facilitated by the close
relationships that financial institutions and their agents had already developed
with government officials in the course of foreign business operations.24
This stage varied across European financial markets. In London, for
example, a few merchant banks established several decades before the 1880s
dominated the market for bond issues. From 1866, the most prominent banking
houses in London were of foreign origin, like Frühling & Goschen or J.S.
Morgan.25 Some had branches in London, like the American house, Morton &
Rose, and others operated in main cities on the continent, as was the case for
houses like Rothschild and Stern, and also for houses of lesser reputation like
Bischoffsheim and Erlangers.26
B. Choosing an Issue System
Each bank could differentiate its offered services with respect to specific
bonds’ issue systems so that choosing a bank and setting a mechanism were
jointly decided. First, the issuer and bank had to choose the most appropriate
issue system, for which several possibilities existed. The simplest way was to use
the system that the French called vente a commission or “sale on commission.”
Banks acted merely as distributors, receiving subscriptions from investors for
the purchase of bonds and, more generally, doing every necessary
administrative step for the floating of the loan.27 For each service, banks
received a commission as a percentage of each bond handled.28 If a bond issue
failed, the banks held no responsibility. On the other hand, governments might
well prefer cash, and receiving it with full certainty often involved the formation
of bank syndicates.29 These syndicates bought part or all of the bonds and then

23. Nowadays, financial intermediaries are called “lead managers.”
24. This latter dynamic has been surprisingly overlooked in secondary literature, although it was a
general rule for some Latin American countries, particularly Argentina in the 1880s, when bank
competition for issues was peaking.
25. See JENKS, supra note 22, at 267.
26. See id. at 268.
27. This system would thus be analogous to today’s “best efforts” system.
28. These commissions could take several forms, including placement, guichet (counter), and
brokerage.
29. One writer defined a financial syndicate as a “means to concentrate capitals, particularly
floating capitals, to canalize them to an economic, industrial or financial object.” IOUDA TCHERNOFF,
LES SYNDICATS FINANCIERS: SYNDICATS D’EMISSION ET DE PLACEMENT, SYNDICATS DE BLOCAGE,
SYNDICATS DE RESISTANCE, SYNDICATS DE BOURSE, INVESTMENT TRUST ET HOLDING: SUIVI DE
FORMULES D’APPLICATION 5 (1930).
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placed them later.30 This was the most popular system in France and Germany
and it also became common practice in other European countries.
In Paris, syndicates were classified into two groups. A “firm offer” syndicate
could subscribe a certain amount of bonds or buy directly from the government,
taking for itself a part or all of the risk of a bond issue’s failure. A “guarantee”
syndicate was represented by a manager who, in return for a commission,
“committed to find underwriters, otherwise he would take firm the remaining of
the issue.”31 This guarantee system was analogous to the underwriting system in
London.32 To ensure the success of the bond issue and to diminish the risk of the
business, issuers arranged for persons or institutions to take a certain amount of
the bonds in the event the public did not subscribe to the entire issue.
By the 1880s, the practice of forming syndicates in London had been
developed over several decades.33 Syndicates had an essential function: to
provide a service of risk insurance against market uncertainty and “ensure a
firm placement of the loan on the market.”34 Risk sharing between the members
of syndicates made the business more attractive, since it decreased the risk of
issue due to the borrower as well as the risk associated with high amounts. In
addition, syndicates were another means to guarantee the placement of some or
all of a government’s issue.35
C. Planning the Issue
This stage depended completely on the issue system chosen. In the case of
syndicates, several terms had to be specified from the very beginning, including
the quantity of bonds to be guaranteed, the nominal rate and issue price, and
every loan feature; only then could banks decide whether or not they should
adhere to the syndicate. Banks also had to agree on other aspects, such as the
syndicate’s starting date, duration, expenses, and expected benefits. Benefits
depended on different commissions and, in the case of the guarantee syndicates,
the manager’s remuneration. This kind of syndicate also demanded a
commission for each bond guaranteed, a placement commission for the unsold
bonds (to be distributed between the members of the syndicate), and a counter
commission. Managers of these syndicates also reserved a part of net benefits
for the payment of their commission. On the other hand, underwriting
syndicates received the difference between the issue price and the purchase

30. See WALTHER LOTZ, DIE TECHNIK DES DEUTSCHEN EMISSIONSGESCHAFTS: ANLEIHEN,
KONVERSIONEN UND GRUNDUNGEN 5 (1890). The difference between the price paid by the banks and
the price of issue offered to investors is the resulting underwriting fee.
31. TCHERNOFF, supra note 29, at 34.
32. The term “underwriting” will therefore be used as synonymous with “firm commitment,” which
is different from today’s general practice of bond issuing with no connection to the distribution system
utilized.
33. See FINNIE, supra note 22, at 2–4.
34. SUZUKI, supra note 22, at 26.
35. Syndicate participants and underwriters did not need to be the same, although syndicates could
be formed to underwrite a loan.
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price (that is, the price at which the government sold the bonds). Depending on
the terms agreed to in the contract, issue expenses could be absorbed either by
the government or by the syndicate. Syndicate participants could be responsible
both for the total results of the syndicate operations and for the part assigned to
them.36
In the underwriting system, issuers contacted institutions or investors who
would commit to subscribing the issue in case the public did not take it all.
Underwriters were usually business partners of the issuers, brokers (that is,
those charged with placing the bonds), or parties that had relationships with the
issuers’ brokers, such as merchants, manufacturers, or other financial
institutions. Merchant bankers active in bond-issue matters usually devoted
some of their assets to underwriting operations in their own-issued bonds and in
other bonds considered attractive to them.
D. Market Placement
In Paris, for example, there were three ways to place a bond issue. First, a
bond could be placed via a public offering, which consisted of an announcement
that public subscriptions to an issue were to take place in certain banks or
financial institutions designated in the prospectus or other public disclosures.37
Second, it could be placed through introduction in the stock market, which
meant that issuers had to determine the introduction price. However, the limits
of price variation were quite narrow.38 For instance, if similar bonds had already
been quoted in the market, the new issue could not then exceed their price.
Furthermore, bond issues depended strongly on temporary movements. Some
authors maintain that issuers used “ficticious” operations to inflate bond
prices.39 This practice was supposedly widespread in London, where
introduction in the stock market was the most common manner to place bonds.
Members of syndicates, underwriters, and brokers purchased bonds before even
the publication of the prospectus. As some writers have noted, “[a]bility to
make the market rather than financial prestige was the crucial qualification for
a successful dealer in Government loans.”40 Curiously, one of the most
remarkable exceptions of financial intermediaries not following this practice
36. Some argue that this depended on the syndicate system chosen. In theory, two different
systems existed. The first was called Lyonnais (from Lyon, where this system was common). For the
non-placed remainder of a bond issue, each participant was to receive a proportional part according to
its number of placed bonds (in other words, each bank was only responsible for the difference between
its syndical part and the number of bonds that it was able to place). The second system was called de la
repartition a la parisienne. If any of the bond issue was not placed, then the unplaced bonds were to be
distributed proportionally between the participants. In practice, a considerable number of hybrid
systems existed. A syndicate manager could, for instance, modify to his preference not only placement
commissions, but also cession to other intermediaries and bond placement prices. See TCHERNOFF,
supra note 29, at 75.
37. This practice was also used in London and other European financial markets.
38. See TCHERNOFF, supra note 29, at 75.
39. See, e.g., CAIRNCROSS, supra note 22, at 93–94; JENKS, supra note 22, at 277–78.
40. JENKS, supra note 22, at 278.
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was Baring.41
The third method of placing a bond issue in Paris was through the banks.
Issuers could use bank branches subject to a commission (called a “placement”
or “counter” commission). If these banks were themselves issuers, it was in
their own interest to directly recommend the bonds to clients in their
establishments. A main characteristic of this system was that no publicity was
attracted other than that from the direct recommendations.42
The entire four-stage process can be summarized as follows: in the simplest
model, the financial intermediary is the only agent between the government and
final investor and merely provides a distribution service (or sale on
commission). Other kinds of more complicated structures, however, could
emerge. Intermediaries could constitute syndicates at any stage depending on
the issue, market situation, and place of issue. In general terms, banks could
also “take firm” an issue, whereby they would act as risk takers if the issue
failed, through direct purchasing of the bonds or through formation of
“guarantee” syndicates. They could also enlist other underwriters to act as
distributors in different financial centers or become parties to any kind of
agreement with the end of ensuring the best results for their issues.
As already mentioned, debt contracts were important because they provided
information on every term agreed upon in the issuing process. They were signed
by the interested parties (that is, the governments and issue banks) from the
very beginning, and they established all the conditions of the bond issues.
IV
ARGENTINEAN, BRAZILIAN, AND CHILEAN CONTRACTS BEFORE THE
BARING CRISIS
The debt contract sources for this article are almost every Argentinean,
Brazilian, and Chilean debt contract for the period of 1880 through 1890. For
Argentina, a significant number of contracts for the period of 1880 through 1913
are available in the Baring and Paribas archives. Additional sources consulted
contain information on the contracts and public finances of Argentina.43 With
41. See CAIRNCROSS, supra note 22, at 93. However, a turning point conducive to Baring’s failure
was the underwriting of the Drainage and Waterworks of Buenos Aires public offering, which markets
rejected. See generally Henry S. Ferns, The Baring Crisis Revisited, 24 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 241 (1992).
42. This would explain why researchers today are not able to find prospectuses on certain loans of
the period. For instance, the absence of these documents seems to be an impediment to the widening of
one researcher’s contracts database. See Layna Mosley, Golden Straightjacket or Golden Opportunity?
Sovereign Borrowing in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries 22, (Univ. of Notre Dame Dep’t of Political
Sci., Working Paper, 2002) (revised version), available at http://www.unc.edu/~lmosley/mosleygold
standardapril2003.pdf.
43. See generally PEDRO AGOTE, RAPPORT DU PRÉSIDENT DU CRÉDIT PUBLIC NATIONAL,
PIERRE AGOTE, SUR LA DETTE PUBLIQUE, LES BANQUES, LES BUDGETS, LES LOIS D’IMPÔT ET LA
FRAPPE DES MONNAIES DE LA NATION ET DES PROVINCES (TRADUIT DE L’ESPAGNOL PAR HENRI
MENJOU. LIVRE IV (ET LIVRE V)) (1887 and 1889); see also JOSÉ PEÑA, DEUDA ARGENTINA:
COPILACIÓN DE LEYES, DECRETOS, RESOLUCIONES, NOTAS, Y CONTRATOS SOBRE LA DEUDA
PÚBLICA NACIONAL 1 (1907).
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regard to Brazil, the Rothschild archives contain all the contracts of the period,
although a good amount of information in those contracts can be found in other
sources like the Brazilian Yearbook44 and in the Ministry of Finance reports.45
For Chile, the Rothschild archives contain some contracts, and additional
information can be found in the Crédit Lyonnais archives.
Contrary to contemporary practices, debt contracts in the 1880s varied from
one underwriter to another, depending on whether a bank and a country held a
long-term relationship.46 More generally, these documents began with a
statement explaining how a country’s parliament had authorized an external
loan for which the contract established the agreed terms between the
government and the underwriting bank or banks. The number of clauses varied
describing the specifics of each loan, such as whether it involved short-term
advances, the bond’s characteristics, the date and places of issue, and the way
and times of funds sending. A contract could include an agreed price of issue (as
was the case in Rothschild’s contracts with Brazil), agreed minimum prices,47
agreed dates of issue (thus excluding a price of issue), or none of them, with the
result that banks could decide both date and price at issue and thus
underwriting fees and benefits. A firm-commitment contract would typically
include in one of the first clauses, “The Government of the Republic of
Argentina sells and the above specified syndicate buys the totality of the
loan . . . at 88% . . . .”48
The history of Argentina’s external debt, like that of most Latin American
sovereign debt, was an eventful one throughout the nineteenth century. For the
purposes of this study, the decade prior to the crisis is divided into three subperiods.49 In the first sub-period, 1880 through 1884, Argentina signed four
contracts with European bankers. One important characteristic of these years
was the dominance of French banks in the Argentinean national business,
replacing British banks’ dominating position and limiting them to bond-placing
activities. French banks successfully upstaged British competition by creating
underwriting syndicates (later imitated by German banks), whereas British
banks acted alone and engaged only in financial intermediation activities
without the risk of commitment.50
44. THE BRAZILIAN YEARBOOK, Vol. 1–2 (J.P. Wileman ed., 1908–1909).
45. Ministry of Finance Reports from 1883, 1886, and 1888, http://www.crl.edu/fr/brazil/ministerial/
fazenda (last visited Nov. 25, 2010).
46. Boilerplate contracts were commonly used and, consequently, modifications were introduced at
a slow pace. For a review and discussion on the current evolution of boilerplate contracts, see Mitu
Gulati & Stephen J. Choi, The Evolution of Boilerplate Contracts: Evidence from the Sovereign Debt
Markets (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Grp., Paper No. 05-17; Georgetown Law & Econ.
Research Paper Grp., Paper No. 800,264, 2005).
47. For examples of agreed minimum prices in Argentinean contracts, see infra Table 1.
48. Paribas Archives, reference 102 955 637 A 57. Author’s translation from Spanish. For instance,
see the 1887 contract shown below between Argentina and a syndicate of European bankers.
49. See HAROLD E. PETERS, THE FOREIGN DEBT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 33–49 (1934).
50. For a detailed description of French banks entering Argentinean business, see Andres
Regalsky, Exportaciones de Capital Hacia los Países Nuevos: los Bancos Franceses y las Finanzas
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The second sub-period is the year 1885, a brief period of crisis in Argentina
after it left a temporary gold-standard regime. During this year, Argentina’s
government and European banks involved in Argentinean bond issuance signed
a contract: it cancelled two previous loans that had completely failed and
converted the debt into a large long-term loan while conceding a new shortterm advance to alleviate a critical fiscal situation. It also, however, imposed
hard conditions on Argentina’s government, even though, as later shown, they
would not be met.
The third sub-period of 1886 through 1889 began with the issue of the longterm loan in two parts, one in January of 1886 and the other in 1887. This subperiod encompasses an important boom in Argentinean bonds—national (five
loans, including three conversions), provincial, and municipal—and the entry of
a new competitor: German banks.
A. First Sub-period (1880–1884): The Breakdown of the British Monopoly
Table 1: Argentina’s Debt Contracts51
Loans

Nominal
Amount
(millions £)

Net
Purchase
Price (a)

Proportion of
the Loan Taken
Firm (b)

Issue
Price

Resulting
Fee

Short-term
Advance (b);
[Commission,
and Interest
Rate]

Commission
on Sold
Bonds

Minimum
Price

Railways 1881
6%

2.45

82

1

91

9

0

0

No

Treasury 6%

0.81

90.5

1

92.5

2

0

0

No

0

No

National Bank
1884 5%
Salubridad and
Riachuelo 5%
Public Works 5%
1885 Agreement
5%
National Bank
1886 5%
Railways 1886
5%
Conversion Hard
Dollars 3.5%
Refinance 1887
4.5%
Refinance 1889
4.5%

1.7

79.35

0.56 (c)

84.5

5.1

0.56 [0.25 (d),
6%]

NA

0

2.5

Yes

5.7

0

0

Yes

2.5

Yes, 75

0

No

5.9

78.6

0.33

Not
issued

2.4

78.3

0.33

84

0.48
[0.5 (e), 6%]
0.75
[0.5 (d), 6%]

8.4

0

0

NA

NA

2

85

0.75 (c)

90

5

3.9

80

0

84.5

4.5

0

2.5*

No

2.75

0

0

NA

NA

0

1.25

No

5.26

82.5

1

87

4.5

0

0

Yes, 85

5.29

85.5

1

90

4.5

0

0

Yes, 88

This table shows the loans issued from 1880 through 1889 and their key
characteristics.52 The first two loans were contracted with the Paribas syndicate,

Publicas Argentinas 1881–1887, 5 REVISTA DE HISTORIA ECONÓMICA 73, 73–97 (1987).
51. (a) Purchase price as part of the nominal amount issued; (b) part from total amount; (c) firm
part taken by the banks, or short-term advance; (d) each trimester; (e) each semester. See Juan Flores,
Lorsque le leader suit la foule: la crise Baring dans une perspective microéconomique 209–10 (2004)
(unpublished dissertation) (on file with Sciences Po Paris).
52. Financial market conditions in Europe could also have affected contract terms and,
particularly, purchase prices in firm-taking contracts. Controlling for this fact by dividing the purchase
price with the normalized price of the U.K. consol at contract date (not reported in the tables) does not
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which dominated the market for issues of Argentina’s national government
bonds during the first half of the 1880s.53 Fierce competition between
intermediaries marked the negotiation of the first loan (the “Railway Loan”).
For the first time since the independence of the country, Argentina’s national
government received several offers from British and French banks even before
the Argentinean parliament had promulgated the law allowing the external
loan.54 An interesting feature of the loan is that the government showed a strong
preference for “firm offers,” thereby leaving a sizable amount on the table.
Thus, although the issue price was 9155 and was not determined by the contract,
the purchase price received by the government was only 82.56
The second loan contracted by Paribas was the “Treasury Loan” of a much
smaller amount. It was also negotiated on a firm basis, yet the public offering
resulted in an unexpected reduced underwriting fee for the banks. Unfavorable
conditions in European markets57 and the high frequency of new bond issues58
seem to be the principal factors underlying this unforeseen reduction.
Matters then became more complicated. For the third loan, known as the
“National Bank Loan”, the same syndicate refused to take the whole loan on a
firm basis at the first stage. It opted instead to make a short-term advance to the
government while preserving the possibility of buying firm, in a one-year
period, the totality of the loan or the nominal capital equivalent of the sum to
be paid by the Argentinean government.
For each of the public offerings, Baring acted as the sole issuer in London.
More specifically, the French syndicate negotiated the loans with Argentina’s
government, then agreed with Baring through another contract on the
conditions under which Baring would place the bonds in the London market.59
This sub-period ended with two loans negotiated at almost the same time
with two different syndicates, but both of which failed to be placed in the
market. The “Public Works Loan” was signed with a new Anglo–French
change the basic results. For complete contract features, see supra Table 1.
53. Members of that syndicate were Paribas, Cahen d’Anvers, and Comptoir d’Escompte.
54. According to Regalsky, supra note 50, at 79, four candidates were ready to negotiate the loan
issue: two English banks and two French syndicates (represented by Paribas and Société Générale,
respectively). However, Jones writes that two other banks were also interested in the affair: the Spanish
bank of Vega, Ibañez & Co., and Erlanger & Co. from London. See Charles A. Jones, European
Bankers and Argentine, 1880–1890 3 (Univ. of Cambridge, Ctr. of Latin Am. Studies, Bus. Imperialism
Series, Working Paper No. 3, 1972).
55. All prices are expressed as a percentage of the bonds’ nominal value (this would be 91% of a
bond worth 100 sterling pounds).
56. The resulting underwriting fee, which was extraordinarily high, was unknown at the moment of
the contract; Argentina’s government expected a negative shock (war against Chile) that would damage
the country’s credit. See Jones, supra note 54, at 5.
57. Regalsky, supra note 50, at 81.
58. Jones, supra note 54, at 6.
59. The contracting parties stipulated a 1% placement commission on the nominal amount of the
loan for Baring, and the syndicate was in charge of all expenses for the issue. At the same time,
commissions paid by the Argentinean government were to be shared between Baring and the syndicate:
1% on coupon payments and 0.5% on redemption.
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syndicate. The main cause behind the switch of bankers was the refusal of the
Paribas syndicate to issue any new loans before the market had absorbed the
whole amount of bonds from former issues that still remained in their hands.
The new loan was also negotiated on a firm basis, although for only one-third of
the issue. However, on the eve of the issuance in September 1884, widespread
rumors about convertibility suspension in Argentina caused the syndicate to be
left with most of the bonds in their hands.60 Finally, the Paribas syndicate agreed
to negotiate a new loan called “Salubridad y Riachuelo Loan” on terms similar
to those of the previous Public Works Loan, although market conditions had
changed to make placement of the bonds impossible.
B. Second Sub-period (1885): The Pellegrini Agreement
At this stage, the Argentinean government found itself needing fresh funds
to meet its short-term obligations. After the 1884 failures, a government agent,
Dr. Carlos Pellegrini, was sent to Europe to unblock the situation.
An agreement between the government and a “unified syndicate” of all
banks participating in the 1884 loans was signed on the 6th and 7th of July,
1885.61 The Salubridad y Riachuelo Loan of £2.4 million, taken by the Paribas
syndicate, was completely cancelled, whereas the Public Works Loan of £4
million nominal value bonds out of £6 million, taken by the syndicate
represented by Société Générale was only partially cancelled. On the other
hand, the government agreed to repurchase part of the loans taken firm by the
banks. The arrangement “consolidated” both loans into one big issue
amounting to £8.4 million, which became the most important loan ever
accorded to a Latin American country.
Not surprisingly, no firm offer was made and the bonds were left to be
placed in the market by the sale-on-commission system.62 The contract
presented two special features. First, it contained the famous guarantee that
Argentina’s government was obliged to cede to the bankers the customs
revenues.63 The National Bank of Argentina, responsible for the collection of
the government’s revenues, was charged with opening a special account for
deposits of the necessary funds to meet debt service. Second, Argentina’s
government committed to not “authorize or sanction, as long as this
Government is in charge, the issue of any loan, without a formal previous

60. See PETERS, supra note 49, at 39.
61. The banks participating in the agreement were Paribas, Comptoir d’Escompte, Cahen
d’Anvers, Société Générale, Crédit Industriel, Baring, and the North American house of Morgan.
62. The government paid 2.5% on the nominal amount of the bonds sold. Charges for the issue,
brokerage, stamp, publicity, and legal fees were all paid by the government as well.
63. In 1884, customs duties were about sixty-two percent of total revenues. Banks seem to have
been aware of this fact. See HENRY S. FERNS, BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 403 (1960) for a detailed discussion on the effects of the agreement. See also Juan Flores,
The Pellegrini Agreement: A Historical Case of Moral Hazard 13 (2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with Sciences Po Paris).
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agreement from the other contracting party.”64 The contract referred specifically
to a loan already approved by the parliament to raise capital for the Bank of the
Province of Buenos Ayres, the most important bank in the country.
However, matters did not happen as foreseen. The Argentinean parliament,
upon whose approval the agreement was conditioned, rejected it on August 11,
1885. Its main reason was the agreement’s inclusion of the guarantee clause,
which was considered “depressive to the dignity of the country.”65 One can only
speculate about the real reasons of this refusal, though gaining more time is a
plausible one. Within the next few months, a new law was passed to take out an
external loan of £4 million. The “Bank of the Province of Buenos Ayres Loan”
was approved by the provincial government, and on October 21, 1885, the
parliament finally voted on a new agreement with the banks. Except for a few
insignificant modifications, the new contract, called the “1885 Agreement” was
practically the same as the previous one.
C. Third Sub-period (1886–1889): The Loan Boom
Despite the prohibitive clause not allowing the Argentinean government to
take new loans, Argentina continued to seek external funds in 1886. In October,
it signed a contract with Murrieta for extension of the “North Station Railway.”
This bank had not participated in the 1885 Agreement; in fact, no bank
participating in that syndicate was allowed to contract new loans. However, the
favorable results of the 1886 issue, the first part of the £8.4 million loan, eased
the market for new bonds. For instance, Baring could finally place a bond issue
for the Bank of the Province of Buenos Ayres as contracted several years
before. However, the real turning point occurred with the entrance of the new
competitors stalking the Argentinean market—the German banks.
On January 25, 1887, a French–German syndicate66 signed a contract to
advance the Argentinean National Bank the equivalent of £1.5 million. As a
guarantee, the syndicate would receive bonds equivalent to £2 million in
internal debt, which were to be converted to external debt by a law to be passed
by the Argentinean parliament. Later, on July 14, 1887, an additional syndicate
represented by Deutsche Bank also signed a contract on a firm basis with
Argentina’s government and aimed to convert the five percent loans contracted
for at the beginning of the decade.67 Once again lacking an English partner in
the syndicate, Baring acted as the issuer in London and obtained a favorable
outcome.
64. Author’s translation from French. Contract of July 1885, Paribas Archives.
65. Congreso Nacional Camara de Diputados, Su Discussion en Session Secreta: la Ley Sancionada,
La Prensa (Oct. 21, 1886).
66. The syndicate was formed by Disconto Gesellshcaft, Norddeutsche Bank, Oppenheim, and
Banque d’Anvers.
67. The other participants were Mendehlsohn, Bank für Hander, Bethmann, Deutsche
Vereinsbank, Disconto Gesellshcaft, Norddeutsche Bank, Bleichschröder Bank, Oppenheim, Cahen
d’Anvers, Heine, Société Génerale pour Favoriser le Développement du Commerce et de l’Industrie en
France, and Société Générale du Crédit Industriel et Commerciale.
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At the end of the decade, Argentina’s national government contracted for
two additional loans. The first contract was signed with a syndicate formed by
German, French, and English banks. The second loan was contracted for with
the banking house of Stern. According to the first contract, the objective of the
loan was the conversion of six percent bonds issued in the 1870s and early
1880s. The syndicate, composed of eight banks, took firm the total amount of
the loan. The second loan was taken by the sale-on-commission system. The
conversion was of the problematic “Hard Dollar Loan” to a 3.5% coupon and
1% redemption.68
From a total of eleven contracts, eight were taken totally or partially firm; of
those eight, six were taken at the moment of the signing of the contract and two
as an option.69 For the latter two contracts taken as an option (both National
Bank loans), a short-term advance was included in the contract. The lowest net
purchase price was the 1884 Public Works Loan while the highest was the
Treasury Loan of 1882. Short-term advances implied interest rates of 7%
(interest rate plus commission) except for the 1886 National Bank Loan, whose
rate was 8%. Sale commissions for the loans not taken firm amounted to 2.5%
on nominal capital, not taking into account the Hard Dollar Loan conversion,
whose commission amounted to only 1.25%.
In conclusion, the conditions surrounding Argentina’s external loans from
1880 through 1889 were quite volatile. It seems that conditions were favorable
at the beginning of the decade, deteriorated considerably between 1884 and
1886, and improved in the final three years.
V
CONTRACT TERMS, ARGENTINA’S ECONOMY, AND UNDERWRITERS’
COMPETITION
After the 1885 Agreement, there was a considerable improvement in the
terms of later contracts from Argentina’s perspective. Banks underwrote half of
the 1886 National Bank Loan, with a better purchase price than the “minimum
price” of the 1885 Agreement, resulting in lower underwriting fees. By the end
of the period, underwriting was complete (that is, entirely firm taken) for all the
loans with higher purchase prices. Thus, Argentina had succeeded in obtaining
the maximum proceeds from its loans while simultaneously avoiding the risk of
placement failures, which it delegated to underwriting banks.

68. This was originally an internal loan issued in 1876 with a nominal amount of six million gold
pesos, bearing 9% annual interest and 4% redemption. Although at the time of the issue, the price
remained low (75% of the bond’s nominal value), by 1881, the quotation was 122. The government
refused to redeem the bonds through purchase in the market and “insisted upon its right to call at par,
which was disputed by British holders.” See PETERS, supra note 49, at 40 (discussing Argentina’s
conflicts with foreign bondholders).
69. There was an additional contract signed with Murrieta for a nominal amount of £0.6 million,
with a 5% coupon issued in June 1887. Insufficient information was available to include this loan in the
analysis.
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What lies behind these results? There may be two answers. A first possible
explanation lies in the behavior of economic fundamentals. Capital markets,
and more precisely, underwriters selling the bonds, were supposed to closely
monitor the Argentinean economic position. Therefore, one would have
expected that a government exhibiting solid fundamentals would have had
access to loans on better terms, reflecting the decreased risk of default. In other
words, the stronger the fundamentals, the better these terms. As mentioned
previously, bankers expected diminished risks and higher profits for bond issues
of “well behaved” countries, so they had incentives to sweeten their offers
concerning government loans.
A second possibility is market failure. Regardless of fundamentals, banks
may have become more eager to get the loans as competition intensified.
Competing banks may have been willing to lower fees (offering higher purchase
prices), underwrite higher portions of the loans, or both. This meant that banks
were obliged not only to make better offers concerning prices, but also to take
greater risks. In order to identify the effects of both fundamentals and
competition, the behavior of the Argentinean economy and the banks in that
decade must be examined more closely.
Beginning with Argentinean economic fundamentals, many variables
influenced risk perception of a given country.70 Most studies of late-nineteenthcentury Argentina offer the generalized vision of a vigorous young country that
attracted both labor and capital. The 1880s in particular was an expansionary
period: estimated real GDP per capita amounted to an impressive eight percent
average growth.71 But the other side of the coin is the general fragility of the
economy, which was abruptly disrupted after the Baring crisis. Increasing
obscure deficits, interrupted only during the two years of the 1885 crisis,
marked Argentina’s external position. The gold standard was abandoned after
1885 and an increasing depreciation of the peso then followed. Reserves then in
banks of issue were also decreasing in those years, but monetary issues were
still booming. The following table illustrates some of the variables that
influenced risk perception of Argentina.

70. Literature on nineteenth-century finance has suggested some of the variables. For more
information, see Marc Flandreau, Crises and Punishment: Moral Hazard and the Pre-1914 International
Financial Architecture 32 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 3742, 2003).
71. See Ana María Cerro, La Conducta Ciclica de la Actividad Economica Argentina en el Periodo
1820–1970 (2000) (unpublished thesis) (on file with the Universidad Nacional de Tucuman); ROBERTO
CORTES CONDE, EL PROGRESO ARGENTINO 1880–1914, at 291 (1979); Gerardo della Paolera, How
the Argentine Economy Performed During the International Gold Standard: A Re-examination (1988)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis) (on file with the University of Chicago).
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Table 2: Argentina’s Macroeconomic Situation72
Years

Real GDP
Growth (%)

Depreciation of
Paper Peso /
British pound (%)

Inflation

Deficit /
Public
Revenue

Debt Service /
Public
Revenue

Percentage of
Debt Service
Paid in Gold

1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890

6.03
-0.03
11.9
9.9
17.2
-4.3

37
1.45
-2.87
9.6
21.62
43.33

22.8
3.1
-4
0
19.8
40.9

0.48
0.34
0.18
0.34
0.34
0.25

0.3
0.51
0.43
0.47
0.62
1.07

0.77
0.68
0.6
0.89
0.93
NA

Public finances of the national government as well as provincial and
municipal governments were deteriorating. In fact, a careful analysis of the
fiscal position of the national government gives a good idea of the troubles
faced by Argentina in meeting its debt service.73 One such analysis by Jose
Terry, later to become finance minister during the 1890s, shows that public
finances had already begun to deteriorate by 1885.74
A close examination of the Finance Ministry Reports would reveal some
worrisome signs, as noticed by the press and by different economic reports on
Argentina. First, as already mentioned, public deficits were booming, financed
by external debt and by monetary issues that began in 1887. Second, debt
service as a portion of public revenues was also increasing, due in part to the
further depreciation of the paper peso. Third, debt denominated in foreign
currency (gold) was also higher, including loans in 1887 and 1889 that converted
some paper-denominated loans into gold loans. Finally, beginning in 1887, debt
service was aided by extraordinary revenues, including the sale of public assets
and the gold that came within the government’s purview via the Free Banking
Law.75
Competition was a key factor behind the Baring crisis. First, previous works
on Argentina’s loans in the 1880s have emphasized the competitive behavior of
European bankers in attempting to get the business. Second, comparing
Argentina’s situation with Latin American countries in which competition was
72. GDP growth and inflation from della Paolera, supra note 71; paper peso values are monthly
averages from the figures provided in Bank Returns and Money Market, tbl. Foreign Rates of Exchange
on London, THE ECONOMIST (The Economist Historical Archive, 1843–2006), at 20, available at Gale
Cengage Learning database; Public finance variables from ARGENTINA MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
MEMORIAS DE HACIENDA, 1885–1890, ch. I (Rentas Generales (General Revenues)) and II (Inversion
y Pagos (Ordinary and Extraordinary Expenditures)).
73. See, e.g., DELLA PAOLERA & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 89; Tim Duncan and Sibila Seibert, La
Política Fiscal Durante el Gobierno de Juárez Celman, 1886–1890: Una Audaz Estrategia Financiera
Internacional, 23 DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO 11–34 (1983); ANDRES REGALSKY, MERCADOS,
INVERSIONES Y ELITES: LAS INVERSIONES FRANCESAS EN LA ARGENTINA, 1880–1914, at 182–83
(2001).
74. See TERRY, supra note 12, at 78.
75. Under this law, provinces were supposed to deposit gold in exchange for national government
bonds, thus constituting the reserves of the newly created provincial banks. For the Free Banking Law,
see DELLA PAOLERA & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 240.
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limited (Chile) or nonexistent (Brazil) has illustrated the importance of
competition when debt contracts are negotiated. Third, the terms of a contract
signed between Baring and the Argentinean government, while ultimately not
issued, were the worst of the decade from Argentina’s perspective and were
negotiated at a time when Baring no longer had any competition. Finally, and as
a consequence of the 1890 crisis, Argentina’s re-entrance to international
capital markets was marked by the monopoly of Baring as the only bank issuing
the bonds.
Market shares of Argentina’s two main banks, Murrieta and Baring,
decreased from one hundred percent at the beginning of the 1880s to less than
forty percent by 1889.76 Argentina’s historiography supports the conclusion that
competition between bankers played in favor of Argentina in the form of
decreasing borrowing costs.77 The law approved by the Argentinean congress on
a £2.4 million loan initiated a race among European banks to get the loan.78 As
illustrated in Table 3, after a few months of receiving several offers, the
Argentinean government agreed with the French syndicate, represented by
Paribas, to accept a firm offer with a net price of 82.
Table 3: Successive Offers for the French Loan of 188179
Date

Offer Made By

Purchase Price

Issue System

Observations
Successive offers came afterwards from
other banks improving price terms.

December 1880

Stern

75.5

Sale on
Commission

March 1881

Stern

78

Firm Offer

March 1881

Baring

85

Firm Offer

March 1881

Paribas Syndicate

82

Firm Offer

Stern improved the offer some days later to
80.5 but retired thereafter.
The offer was not finally made because it
was not authorized in London.
The final contract was signed on the 24th.

The second argument involves a comparison of Argentina’s situation with
that of other countries. In order to obtain this comparative benchmark, the
Argentinean situation is analyzed in a broader context by studying two
additional Latin American countries. Brazil, to begin with, signed four contracts
with the Rothschild monopoly. The relationship between Brazil’s government
and Rothschild differed from Argentina’s own relationship with any other bank.
For instance, Rothschild was literally Brazil’s only bank in the sense that the
government had its own account on Rothschild’s balance sheet, thereby
facilitating any monitoring. It was called “Brazil agency”:
This account shows the amount standing to the credit of the Brazilian government,

76. The market share measure is based on the cumulative value of the bonds on the market in each
year.
77. Jones offers a detailed analysis on competition for the first Argentinean loan in the 1880s (the
French Loan). See Jones, supra note 54, at 3.
78. Those banks included Barings, Stern, Vega Ibañez & Co., a French syndicate (BNPB,
Comptoir de’Escompte, and Cahen d’Anvers), Heine, Heimendahl, Murrieta, a second French
syndicate, and Erlanger.
79. See Flores, supra note 51, at 211–12.
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and the amounts debited for dividends and for sinking funds charges. The account is
balanced at the end of each month and a copy is sent to the government. It contains
80
also a record of the installments received on account of each loan . . . .

General conditions for the rest of the Brazilian contracts are shown in Table
4. Unlike Argentina, Brazil was obliged to face all the risk of the issue because
it used a sale-on-commission system. On the other hand, Brazil benefited from
better contract terms than Argentina’s: the minimum price (guaranteed) was
generally higher while commissions were lower. However, these differences
between the countries tended to diminish over time and by the end of the
period were minimal.
Table 4: Brazil’s Contract Terms and Macroeconomic Situation81
Loans

Nominal
Amount
(millions £)

Issue
Price

Net
Price

1883 4.5%
1886 5%
1888 4.5%
1889 4%

4.6
6.4
6.3
19.8

89
95
97
90

86.75
92.75
95.25
88.25

Commission for
Banker’s
Redemption by
Brokerage
Commission
Commission Drawing/Purchase
and Stamps
in the Market
2
0.25
0.5
0.125
2
0.25
0.5
0.125
1.5
0.25
0.5
0.125
1.5
0.25
0.5
0.125

Service /
Revenue

Exchange
Rate
Depreciation

0.4
0.5
0.3
0.3

0.3
-10.7
-11.35
-7.2

A second interesting case is Chile, a country with which Argentina had a
strong rivalry. Chile was indeed given the best terms among the countries
compared in this paper. Differences between Chile and Argentina were more
than marginal. Chile signed four contracts with European and American
banking houses in 1885, 1886, 1887, and 1889. The first contract was signed with
City Bank, but insufficient information exists in order to describe it adequately.
The 1886 and 1887 contracts were signed with Rothschild, and the 1889 contract
featured a syndicate represented by Deutsche Bank that floated the loan.
In terms of economic fundamentals, Chile had a stable but flexible
exchange-rate regime; more importantly, it was less indebted than either
Argentina or Brazil. Table 5 shows its contracts’ terms and economic
fundamentals. A striking feature is that for its 1886 and 1887 contracts,
Rothschild took firm the whole amount of the loans, and for a relatively high
price. In fact, Brazil and Chile are directly comparable because they negotiated
with the same bank. For instance, Rothschild underwrote the issue of the 1887
Chilean loan at a purchase price of 96, good contract terms compared to any
other Latin American country.

80. Rothschild Archives, Transactions of a Committee to Enquire into the Organization of the
Accounts, reference number: RAL 000/179 (Nov. 18, 1908).
81. See Flores, supra note 51, at 214, 254–59.
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Table 5: Chile’s Contract Terms and Macroeconomic Situation82
Loans

Nominal
Amount
(millions £)

1886 4.5%
1887 4.5%
1889 4.5%

6
1,2
1,5

Banker’s
Brokerage
Issue Net
Commission
Commission
Price Price
and Stamps
98
97.1
102

96
96
97

G
G
0.5

0
0
0

Commission for
Redemption by
Drawing/Purchase
in the Market
0.5
0.125
0.5
0.125
0.5
0.125

Service /
Revenue

Exchange
Rate
Depreciation

0.2
0.2
0.2

6.25
-2.29
-1.09

The most advantageous contract for Chile was signed in 1889 with a German
syndicate. Its terms were similar to the Rothschild contracts but had another
feature favorable to Chile, one that arose from competition between banks: the
syndicate paid the first coupon of the loan (thus lowering the final fee paid by
Chile). As far as is known, no other Latin American country could get such a
clause in its contracts, and this reflected the higher status of Chilean credit in
international financial markets. However, as with Brazil, differences between
Argentina and Chile tended to diminish as the decade approached its end, and
the terms of Argentina’s latest loans were only slightly worse than Chile’s. As
discussed before, one possible explanation is that Argentina’s economic
fundamentals improved while Chile’s remained stable or worsened. However,
in reality, Argentina’s fundamentals did not improve and Chile’s did not
change.83
In conclusion, Argentina began the decade with arguably worse terms but
rapidly made up these differences by the end of the period. Clearly, economic
fundamentals cannot explain this “convergence.”
The 1890 Baring contract is further proof that macroeconomics and the
fiscal position of the government were viewed as secondary concerns. Although
the trajectory of Argentina’s contract terms showed improvement in the second
half of the 1880s, the crucial year of 1890 offers a completely different story.
Correspondence of Baring with other bankers reveals how Baring tried to form
a syndicate for a loan issue of £10 million in order to improve the fiscal situation
of Argentina’s national government and support the depreciating peso.84 While
Baring succeeded in convincing Morton and Murrieta to become at least
minimally involved, it remained alone in terms of risk. Clearly, with a desperate
macroeconomic situation and without competition, the terms of this contract
considerably worsened, and the strong conditionality imposed at this stage may
have played a role in Argentina’s eventual decision to default.85
Finally, the crisis and its aftermath marked a difficult period for both
Argentina and Baring. On the one hand, Baring needed a bailout orchestrated

82. See id. at 216, 254–59.
83. See supra Tables 3, 5.
84. ING Baring Archives, HC4.1.113.
85. ING Baring Archives, HC4.1.71 1890 (contract including four clauses that Baring extracted
from the Government in an intensive negotiation: (1) a pledge of customs revenues; (2) no external
borrowing for three years; (3) a reduction of the monetary base in order to appreciate the peso; and (4)
the approval of a law requiring that fifty percent of customs revenues be payable in gold).
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by the Bank of England and was divided into separate branches.86 On the other
hand, Argentina needed two successive funding loans and did not have access to
international capital markets for almost ten years following the crisis. In fact,
the loans contracted between 1900 and 1913 were all negotiated and issued by
Baring, replicating the quasi-monopolist position it held in the pre-1880 period.
VI
CONCLUSION
Financial intermediation and competition issues may have played a key role
in pushing Argentina into the financial situation of 1890 by incentivizing
overborrowing at decreasing costs. The 1880s was a particularly interesting
decade because Baring’s quasi-monopoly over Argentina’s debt issues was
replaced with a competitive market structure. Although Baring was usually
aware of the government’s fiscal position, it had little or no incentive to
properly monitor that position and release information to the market. Rather
than risk its market position, the bank preferred to nourish the mania for
Argentinean bonds, thereby abandoning its gatekeeping functions. Although
other information sources had raised suspicions about the deteriorating
financial situation in Argentina, the market was reassured by Baring’s
involvement with Argentina’s bond issues, reflecting the growing importance of
“reputational intermediaries” in nineteenth-century finance. As conditions for
raising capital worsened between March and July of 1890—with partial default
and political riots in Buenos Aires making the market hostile to any new loans
to Argentina despite Baring’s plans for new issues to ease the situation—neither
the market nor the rent-seeking banks were willing to channel new funds to
Argentina. Hence, this article emphasizes the importance of long-term financial
relationships as the main source of information for underwriters. After 1890,
Baring reemerged as the sole gatekeeper of Argentina’s issues and Argentina
did not default until the First World War. The year 1890, however, marked a
critical turning point in the production and use of information by investors and
financial intermediaries.

86. However, the bank was soon back on its own feet and re-entered the business of foreign
borrowing.

